A members club is the asset. The Line is an ultra-luxury wellness and social club whose recurring membership revenue compounds like an operating business and exits at an operating-business multiple. The first site, a 40 are HGB freehold parcel in the Seseh-Munggu corridor, carries the flagship club and a capped enclave of 18 members-only residences. The residence pre-sales recapitalize the build and de-risk the equity; the retained club is what the investor owns. Bali is site one of a deliberately replicable, multi-market platform. It states plainly what is secured today versus what this capital funds next.
A hospitality operating business funded in large part by a one-time real-estate transaction. The residences capitalize the build; the club generates the ongoing return and the exit multiple. Bali proves a model designed to travel.
The Line is a five-vertical members club, training, bathhouse and recovery, listening library and bar, F&B and workspace, rooftop pool and events, built for the high-net-worth long-stay and resident community on Bali's south-west coast. Its economics are those of a recurring-revenue business: members pay an initiation fee that covers their acquisition cost at signing, then recurring monthly dues plus high-margin ancillary spend. The club breaks even at roughly 295 members, holds a blended gross margin above 55%, and is modeled to reach ~$4.5M of EBITDA at stabilization. That recurring revenue is why a mature club trades at an operating-business multiple rather than a hotel multiple, the reference transaction is Soho House's January 2026 take-private at roughly 16× EBITDA.
The flagship sits on a 40 are (4,000 m²) HGB freehold parcel in the Seseh-Munggu corridor. Alongside the club, the site carries 18 members-only Line Residences, which function as the financing mechanism rather than a separate real-estate play: pre-sold off-plan to qualified members, their staged milestone payments fund the construction of both the residences and, in part, the club, so that outside equity is not consumed building inventory. Priced honestly against the market (see Section 04), the residences roughly pay for themselves on the build, and then keep earning: The Line operates them as a managed-residence hospitality business (services plus a hotel-style rental program), a recurring stream that compounds into the same operating multiple as the club. The investor owns a share of an operating campus whose construction bridge is repaid before distributions.
The capital ask is $8.0M for approximately 30% of the holding company, right-sized to fund land acquisition, the club build, and club working capital through breakeven, the things residence pre-sales cannot fund, without relying on a residence "surplus" that defensible pricing does not produce. The return to the investor is ownership of the retained club and the brand platform, not a pre-sale windfall. The base case returns roughly 4.3× over a seven-year hold (~29% IRR, pre-tax), with a bear case near 2.9× and an upside near 5.9×, the retained operating business being the club plus the managed-residence hospitality layer (all 18 units enrolled in the rental pool). A capped ultra-tier in the membership structure (Section 02) and the residence-hospitality revenue both lift the base clear of a 15% hurdle. A layer of platform optionality (co-investment rights in subsequent markets) sits on top of those figures.
The club is the core of what the investor owns at the end. Its value rests on recurring revenue, high retention, and a credible operating-business exit multiple. The managed-residence hospitality layer (Section 04) adds a second recurring stream at the same multiple.
Membership dues are ~53% of club revenue at stabilization, with F&B and events the balance; because members return year after year, the great majority of revenue recurs. Membership is structured in price-locked tiers (the lock applies to monthly dues, not joining fees), Founding ($1,500 join, $350/mo, capped at 150), Charter ($3,500 join, $280/mo), Regular ($4,500 join, $395/mo), a new capped Founders Reserve ultra-tier ($25,000 join, $1,250/mo, 40 seats), plus a high-margin Remote/digital tier, engineered for retention through a five-vertical facility a single-discipline competitor cannot replicate. Joining fees recover member-acquisition cost at signing, giving an LTV:CAC of roughly 11× to 20× and CAC payback under six months.
| Club P&L driver | Bear | Base | Upside | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paying members at Y5 (avg) | ~550 | ~830 | ~1,140 | Downside ~550 / base ~830 / upside ~1,140 toward the 1,500-member cap. Remote + corporate seats additional. |
| Total club revenue (Y5) | ~$7.6M | ~$11.3M | ~$15.0M | ~53% membership dues; F&B + events the balance. |
| EBITDA margin | ~40% | ~40% | ~39% | Ramps from ~24% (Year 1) to stabilized; premium-tier dues lift the blend. |
| Club EBITDA (Y5) | ~$3.0M | ~$4.5M | ~$5.8M | Carried into the returns in Section 08. |
| Exit multiple | 10× | 12× | 14× | An 8 to 14× sensitivity; a discount to Soho House (~16×, Jan 2026). |
| Implied club enterprise value | ~$30M | ~$54M | ~$81M | On stabilized EBITDA. |
Source: the management financial model (monthly tier-level club build) and Soho House & Co take-private (MCR/Apollo, January 2026, ~16× EBITDA).
Membership dues carry ~95% incremental margin and compound through the exit multiple, and the price lock applies to monthly dues, not joining fees. The structure below, anchored by a capped ultra-tier, carries ~$4.5M/yr of recurring dues at the ~830-member base (~$4.8M/yr at full subscription of the capped tiers) plus ~$5.3M of cumulative one-time joining fees, with the uncapped Remote/Corporate tier carrying the balance of the ~53% recurring share, supporting the base case's ~$4.5M Year-5 EBITDA and ~29% IRR.
| Tier | Join | Monthly | Cap | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Founding | $1,500 | $350 | 150 | A marketing asset and social proof for Charter and Regular. ~$630K/yr. |
| Charter | $3,500 | $280 | 175 | ~$610K of one-time joining fees across 175 seats; the price lock is on the monthly dues. ~$590K/yr of dues. |
| Regular | $4,500 | $395 | ~635 | All-in Y1 $9,240, at peer median, below Six Senses Place London (~$10K) and far below Aman Club. ~$3.0M/yr of dues at the ~635 base-case seats. |
| Founders Reserve | $25,000 | $1,250 | 40 | Fills the gap between Charter ($6.9K Y1) and Aman Club ($215K Y1). 4% of capped seats, ~12% of capped-tier dues: $600K/yr recurring + $1.0M one-time. |
| Remote / Corporate | Digital + corporate tiers | Remote $0 / $110 (~90% margin); corporate team / executive / enterprise seats. | ||
| Contribution (base ~830 members) | ~$4.5M/yr recurring dues + ~$5.3M one-time joining fees (cumulative) | Capped tiers only; the Remote/Corporate tier carries the balance. Supports ~$4.5M Year-5 EBITDA and ~29% base IRR. | ||
Sensitivity: the Regular tier's $4,500 / $395 price point is the main ramp sensitivity; the Charter and Founders Reserve tiers are largely independent of total member count. Final pricing to be confirmed against live local benchmarks.
The club and residences are sited on a 40 are HGB freehold parcel in the Seseh-Munggu corridor. The parcel is identified; the LOI is the first use of funds and the first gate.
| Attribute | Seseh-Munggu 40 are (flagship) |
|---|---|
| Land area | 4,000 m² (40 are) |
| Tenure | HGB freehold, to be acquired and held via PT PMA (HGB held directly on the underlying title by the PT PMA, a 30 + 20 + 30 year renewable right, the strongest tenure available to a foreign-owned entity, vs. a lease over someone else's title) |
| Target land cost | $3.0M (~IDR 1.3B / are × 40) |
| Acquisition costs | ~$0.3M (BPHTB 5%, notary, legal, HGB perfection) |
| Zoning | Tourism sub-zone (W), club, F&B, hospitality permitted |
| Max footprint (KDB 50%) | 2,000 m² |
| Max GFA (KLB 2.0×) | 8,000 m² |
| Height cap | 15m (3 to 4 floors) |
| Program GFA | 7,700 m² (96% of envelope): club 2,500 m² + residences 5,200 m² |
| Component | Footprint | Floors | GFA | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Line Members Club | 700 m² | 3.5 | 2,500 m² | Five verticals stacked vertically: training, bathhouse + recovery, library + bar, F&B + lounge + workspace, rooftop pool + events. 1,500-member capacity. |
| Line Residences (18 units) | 1,300 m² | 4 | 5,200 m² | 10 pied-à-terre @ 200 m² + 8 family @ 400 m². Members-only ownership covenant; a separate building on the campus, with its own lobby and direct members-only club access a short walk across the grounds. |
| Total GFA | 2,000 m² | n/a | 7,700 m² | 96% of the 8,000 m² envelope at full KDB/KLB. |
Envelope per Perda Provinsi Bali and Badung spatial planning (KDB 50%, KLB 2.0×, 15m).
The residences fund the build, seed the membership, and then keep earning. Priced to real comparables, their pre-sales recapitalize construction; once built, The Line operates them as a recurring managed-residence hospitality business (Soho House's owned-residence model).
| Product | Units | Avg m² | $/m² | $/unit | Gross |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Line Residence · Pied-à-Terre | 10 | 200 | $5,200 | $1.04M | $10.4M |
| Line Residence · Family | 8 | 400 | $4,000 | $1.60M | $12.8M |
| Total (base case) | 18 | ~290 avg | ~$4,460 blended | ~$1.29M avg | ~$23.2M |
Bear case (lower-range pricing / partial absorption): ~$17.6M. Upside case (top-of-range branded scarcity, ~$5,100/m²): ~$26.7M.
Pricing references: Seseh local villas $1,700 to 2,400/m² (REID 2025); premium Canggu ~$2,600/m²; branded operator product (Mandarin Oriental Residences, Bukit Pandawa) materially above local rates and well above The Line's per-meter ask; beachfront/cliff trophy (Aman, Raffles) $9 to 15K/m². Line Residences are positioned in the club-integrated branded band between premium-local and branded-beachfront. Final pricing subject to broker validation against live comparables.
The residences are not only a one-time financing event. Once built, The Line operates them as an ongoing managed-residence hospitality business, the structure Soho House layers onto its owned residences, producing recurring EBITDA that earns the club's operating multiple. Two streams:
| Stream | Base assumption | Y5 EBITDA |
|---|---|---|
| Managed rental program (hotel-style) | All 18 units enrolled; ~55% occupancy (pied-à-terre ~$700 ADR, family ~$1,700). The Line runs the rentals (reservations, housekeeping, F&B, guest services); operating costs are netted, then the net splits 60/40 on the pied-à-terre and 70/30 on the family units (owner/operator). The ~$1.0M is The Line's net operator share. | ~$1.0M |
| Managed services + service charge | The ~$45/m² building service charge (management + common areas) at a margin, plus maintenance and concierge for owners. No overlap with the line above: rental-period housekeeping & F&B are netted there, and member dining sits in the club P&L. | ~$0.2M |
| Residence Hospitality EBITDA (Y5) | Bear ~$0.8M (softer ADR / occupancy) · Upside ~$1.6M (stronger ADR / occupancy). | ~$1.2M |
Residence buyers are underwritten on total return, net rental yield plus capital appreciation, not cash yield alone. Priced as a club-integrated scarcity product, the units target the 12 to 17% total-return band that makes a Bali branded residence attractive; the larger family units carry a more owner-favorable 70/30 split so both formats clear it.
| Per unit | Price | ADR | Split | Net cash yield | + Appreciation | Total return |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pied-à-terre · 200 m² | $1.04M | ~$700 | 60/40 | ~5.7% | ~6 to 8% | ~12 to 14% |
| Family · 400 m² | $1.60M | ~$1,700 | 70/30 | ~10.5% | ~6 to 8% | ~16 to 18% |
~$26.1M all-in, with a 20% contingency (Bali ultra-luxury first-build overruns of 25 to 40% are common) and land acquisition costs included.
| Land (40 are × ~IDR 1.3B/are) | $3.0M | Target acquisition cost, to be locked at LOI. |
| Land acquisition costs | $0.3M | BPHTB 5%, notary, legal, HGB perfection. |
| Club construction (2,500 m² × $2,000/m²) | $5.0M | Top of the Bali ultra-premium range; bottom-up budget runs lower (~$3.4M), held high for prudence. |
| Residence construction (5,200 m² × $2,000/m²) | $10.4M | Ultra-luxury fit-out. |
| Soft costs (design, permits, AMDAL, FF&E, pre-opening) ~12% | $2.6M | Architecture, MEP, entitlement, FF&E, pre-opening. |
| Sales & marketing (residences) ~5% of gross | $1.2M | Sales gallery, brokerage, render-grade marketing. |
| Contingency 20% | $3.6M | On construction + soft costs. Honest buffer for a first luxury build. |
| Total project cost | $26.1M | Plus construction-period standby-facility interest (~$0.3M base; see the cash-flow model). |
Equity funds the club, the land, and working capital. Residence pre-sales fund the residence build and backfill. There is no large "surplus", defensible pricing does not produce one, and we do not pretend it does.
| Source | Amount | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Founder capital (deployed + pro-rata) | $0.75M | Founder | $0.35M already spent on DD, PT PMA, legal; $0.40M on the same terms as investors. |
| Outside investor equity | $8.00M | Equity | ~30% of HoldCo at ~$18.7M pre-money / ~$26.7M post. Single-round close; 8% cumulative preferred ahead of founder economics. Pre-money grounded in the club, not the residences. |
| Line Residence pre-sale signing payments (25%) | $5.8M | Customer cash | In escrow on signed PPJB. |
| Line Residence milestone and handover payments (75%) | $17.4M | Customer cash | 30% at structure (mid-2028) + 30% at fit-out (early 2029) + 15% at handover (Q4 2029) — staged PPJB |
| Standby facility (peak; repaid) | ~$3.8M | Bridge debt | Covers milestone-timing gaps; repaid from collections before any distribution. |
| Total sources | $31.95M | Less ~$2.6M residence transaction tax/CIT → ~$29.4M net. |
| Net sources (after residence tax) | ~$29.4M | From above. |
| (Less) Total project cost | ($26.1M) | Section 05. |
| Net working-capital cushion | ~$3.3M | Funds club ramp to breakeven + reserve. No distributable "surplus", the return is the retained club equity. |
Each capital commitment is gated on a validated milestone. Land is controlled before construction; residences are built in tranches against confirmed pre-sales, not on spec.
The return is ownership of the retained operating business, the club plus the managed-residence hospitality layer, realized at a future liquidity event, plus distributions and a partial early capital return from residence collections. Honest, range-bound, and pre-tax.
| Component | Bear | Base | Upside | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity invested (2026) | ($8.0M) | ($8.0M) | ($8.0M) | Single round, ~30% of HoldCo. |
| Waterfall distributions pre-exit (Y3 to Y6): capital return + 8% preferred, then pro-rata | +$6.5M | +$12.0M | +$13.7M | Staged residence collections + operating cash through the documented waterfall; joining fees help fund an earlier return. |
| Exit distribution Y7 (~30% of EV + residual cash) | +$17.5M | +$22.3M | +$33.3M | Operating EV bear ~$38M / base ~$68M / upside ~$103M, 10 to 14× on club + residence-hospitality EBITDA of ~$3.8 / 5.7 / 7.3M. |
| Total investor cash at Y7 | ~$22.9M | ~$34.4M | ~$47.0M | Cash returned + retained equity value. |
| MOIC / IRR (pre-tax, 7-yr) | ~2.9× / ~18% | ~4.3× / ~29% | ~5.9× / ~37% | Net-of-structure IRR ~3 to 4 pts lower (see caveat). |
| Payback (capital returned) | At exit (2033) | 2031 (Year 5) | By 2031 | Year cumulative investor distributions reach the $8.0M invested; the base case clears the accrued 8% preferred by 2032. |
Bali is site one. The reason to back The Line is the replicable, brandable, recurring-revenue platform behind it, and a 30% holder participates in every market that follows.
The Line's archive has carried a multi-market roadmap from the outset, Chiang Mai, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Lisbon, Tulum and others have been named as candidate markets. That ambition is credible only once the unit economics are proven at site one, which is why this strategy resists overselling it: the platform is optionality, not promised value. But the optionality is real and it is structured:
Tested against active Bali ultra-luxury comparables and the reference club transaction. The Line Residences are positioned below branded beachfront/cliff product; the club multiple sits at a discount to the Soho House transaction.
| Comparable | Location | Scale | Reference $/m² or multiple | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Soho House & Co (take-private) | Global | 40+ houses | ~16× EBITDA | MCR/Apollo, Jan 2026, $2.7B. The members-club exit reference. The Line base uses 12×. |
| Soho Beach House Los Cabos | Mexico (Cabo) | House + keys + residences | Members house + managed residences | Model precedent for the residence-hospitality layer (Section 04): a members' beach house with integrated keys and owned/managed residences earning recurring service and rental revenue. The Line mirrors the structure capital-light, a managed pool on sold units. |
| Mandarin Oriental Residences, Bali | Bukit Pandawa cliff | ~68 villas | Branded; well above local rates | Branded + cliff-front + 2027 completion. The benchmark The Line prices below. |
| Pandawa One | Bukit Pandawa | 22 plots (~1,220 m²+) | Ultra-exclusive land plots | Scarcity-positioning reference; serviced plots, buyer-built, not a built-villa $/m² comp. |
| Raffles Residences Bali | Bali coast | 28 oceanfront villas (502 m²+) | Branded beachfront | Launching Q2 2026; current branded-beachfront supply signal. |
| Seseh local villas | Seseh / Mengwi | various | $1,700 to 2,400/m² | REID 2025. The local floor; Line Residences sit at ~2× this on club integration. |
| Regent Bali Canggu | Canggu | 150 keys | ADR ~$760 | Opened Dec 2024; reset the corridor's premium ceiling, the demand tailwind. |
Branded-residence pricing for Mandarin Oriental and Pandawa One is delivered by the appointed sales channel rather than printed; final Line Residence pricing should be validated directly against those live figures before launch. The team reviewing this strategy is positioned to perform exactly that validation.
This is a project that rewards an execution partner, not only a passive check. The capabilities it needs map directly onto a development-and-capital-markets team operating in Indonesia.
| Stage / need | What it requires | Value layer for a partner |
|---|---|---|
| Land & entitlement | LOI negotiation, HGB/PMA structuring, PKKPR/PBG, clean title diligence on agricultural-overlay and zoning risk. | Legal / corporate-finance fees; de-risked entry |
| Development & delivery | Single-architect coordination, fixed-price GMP, phased construction management, cost control against the 20% contingency. | Development / project-management fees |
| Residence sales | Off-plan brokerage to a qualified HNW pool; comp validation; absorption against the 18-unit cap. | Sales commissions (3 to 5% of ~$23M) |
| Capital structuring | HoldCo, escrow, tax-efficient cross-border distribution, future-round architecture for the platform. | Structuring; co-invest priority on market two |
| Brand & demand | Membership pipeline build (the key operating risk), launch marketing, media positioning. | Equity upside on a faster ramp |
| Risk | Probability | Impact | Mitigant |
|---|---|---|---|
| Land not yet under LOI, acquisition / title / price risk | Medium | High | Gate 1. LOI + full diligence before any construction capital. Funds released only on clean HGB title, confirmed zoning, and price at/below target. |
| Membership ramp falls short of ~830 by Y5 | Medium-High | High | The key operating risk. Pre-opening membership drive; founding-tier scarcity; corridor demand. Breakeven is only ~295 members, so the asset is profitable well below target. Residence rental + service income does not depend on member count, a partial hedge. |
| Residence absorption below plan | Medium | Medium | Priced to real comps; phased build against confirmed sales (no spec inventory); broker validation pre-launch. Branded-residence demand has softened island-wide. |
| Residence rental-pool participation / ADR below plan | Medium | Low-Medium | Recurring hospitality EBITDA scales with occupancy and owner participation. Base assumes all 18 units enrolled (default opt-out pool); the club's F&B, brand and member network support occupancy. Owners opting out or softer ADR trims the hospitality layer, not the club. |
| Entitlement (PKKPR/PBG) or agricultural overlay (LP2B) delay | Medium | High | Pre-screen via OSS before land closing; tourism sub-zone (W) confirmed; counsel-led entitlement. |
| Construction cost inflation >20% over plan | Medium | Medium | Fixed-price GMP; 20% contingency. |
| Tax leakage, VAT, CIT/final tax, PPnBM, cross-border | Medium | Medium | Counsel sign-off; structure units to manage PPnBM threshold; Singapore HoldCo. Modeled at ~$3M and ~3 to 4 pts of IRR. |
| FX (IDR / USD) | Medium | Medium | IDR construction cost, USD pre-sale collection, natural hedge. USD ADR/pricing has drifted with IDR strength. |
| Foreign ownership / HGB tenure friction | Low | Medium | Standard HGB-via-PMA; deliverable because the land is held HGB freehold. Counsel-vetted purchase agreements. |
| Exit multiple compression / single-asset liquidity | Medium | Medium | Base uses 12× (discount to Soho House 16×). Platform / second market improves liquidity and supports multiple expansion. |
| Key-person / founder dependence | Medium | Medium | The Line self-operates through its own in-house leadership team; an execution-support partner reduces single-point dependence. Honest: the team has not yet exited a multi-property platform. |
The open items, stated plainly. Each is gated in the plan; none changes the capital ask.
| Decision | Current assumption | To resolve |
|---|---|---|
| Land LOI & price | 40 are at ~IDR 1.3B/are ($3.0M) | Initiate LOI; confirm price, title, and seller. First gate, everything follows from this. |
| Valuation / ownership split | $8M for ~30% (pre-money ~$18.7M) | Pre-money is grounded in the club's recurring earnings; the first close prices at this pre-money, with a step-up at the final close. |
| Membership pricing & Founders Reserve | Per §02, Founding / Charter / Regular + Founders Reserve ultra-tier | Validate the Regular price point against absorption; confirm ~40 price-insensitive Founders Reserve buyers in the pipeline. |
| Residence pricing | ~$4,460/m² blended (~$23M gross) | Validate against live MORB / branded comps via the sales channel before launch. |
| Residence unit mix | 10 pied-à-terre + 8 family | Manage PPnBM luxury-tax threshold on the larger units; consider mix that keeps contract values structured efficiently. |
| Residence hospitality scope (rental pool) | All 18 units enrolled (default opt-out pool); 60/40 split (pied-à-terre), 70/30 (family) | Confirm default-enrollment (opt-out) vs. mandatory vs. opt-in; reserved owner-use weeks; the per-format split. The base case assumes full enrollment. |
| Owned hotel keys (vs. sell all 18) | Sell all 18; operate sold units as the rental pool | Option: retain ~2 to 4 units as company-owned boutique keys at launch, full room revenue, member trial-stays and a stronger ramp hedge, at the cost of ~$1 to 2M of foregone pre-sale cash per unit (more equity, or fewer units sold). |
| Unit count vs. size (envelope-constrained) | 18 units at ~$4,460/m² | Already ~96% of GFA. A 24-unit variant (avg ~215 m², same envelope) adds ~6 buyers + rental-pool units and lifts gross to ~$27M plus the hospitality layer, trading per-unit scarcity and added club-capacity load. Model both. |
| Pre-sale threshold for groundbreaking | ~30 to 40% pre-sold | Higher threshold = more de-risking, slower start. Set with the construction partner. |
| Capital-return mechanism | Residence collections + club cash | Whether to add a modest club refinancing at stabilization to accelerate capital return (trades leverage for speed). |
| Resale restriction on residences | Restricted to qualified members | Right-of-first-refusal to the club vs. fully open. Liquidity for buyers vs. community for the club. |
| Platform sequencing | Market two after Bali proof | Which market, and the co-invest terms offered to this round. |