The opportunity
in Seseh is sized,
sourced, and timed.

The Line is an ultra-luxury wellness and social club whose recurring membership revenue compounds like an operating business and exits at an operating-business multiple. The flagship sits on a targeted 40 are (4,000 m²) HGB freehold parcel (a forward acquisition) in the Seseh-Munggu corridor and carries the club alongside a capped enclave of 18 members-only Line Residences. The residences are pre-sold off-plan to qualified members; their staged milestone payments fund the build so that outside equity mainly buys the retained club. A future ADRIFT beachfront hotel remains an optional, separately-capitalized expansion, out of this raise.

The land is a forward acquisition: the 40 are HGB freehold target is identified but not yet under LOI or contract. Land acquisition is the first use of the equity round and the first gate, conditioned on clean title diligence, a confirmed HGB/PMA pathway, PKKPR zoning conformity, and a price at or below the underwritten target. The parcel sits within Sub-Zone W (Tourism) under the Badung spatial plan, with a 50% building base coefficient and 2.0 floor area coefficient envelope. (A separate 10 are leased parcel previously associated with the project is being redirected to an unrelated brewery concept and is not part of this strategy.)

The club breaks even at roughly 295 members and is modeled to reach ~$4.5M of EBITDA at stabilization. At a base exit multiple of 12×, a deliberate discount to the Soho House precedent (~16× EBITDA, Jan 2026 take-private) and a premium to the 8 to 12× that SE Asian luxury resort assets trade at, the retained club is worth roughly $54M of enterprise value (bear ~$30M / upside ~$81M); with the managed-residence hospitality layer (~$1.2M Y5 EBITDA, all 18 units pooled) the retained operating business is worth roughly $68M (bear ~$38M / upside ~$103M). The 18 residences, priced at ~$4,460/m², contribute ~$23M of gross pre-sales that fund construction and then run as recurring hospitality.

The timing window is defined, not closing. The Seseh corridor is undersupplied in branded luxury, the September 2025 construction moratorium is constricting future permit flow, and Anantara Dragon Seseh (216 keys, 2027) will validate the corridor as a luxury destination, a halo effect that supports residence absorption and the club's membership demand.

Seseh sits in the Mengwi district of Badung Regency, on the western edge of the Canggu-Pererenan-Seseh corridor. The corridor is dramatically undersupplied in branded luxury, estimated at just 350 to 400 luxury keys versus Seminyak's 1,300+ and Nusa Dua's 5,500+.

The real estate data tells a consistent story. Seseh's median property price of $337K trades above the Bali benchmark of $280K. Rental occupancy sits at 61% versus the Bali average of 54%. Average daily rates in Mengwi ($323) outperform every other submarket except Tabanan. Supply growth in Seseh has been incremental, rental inventory rose from 173 in January to 334 by December 2025, preserving the low-density residential character.

Mengwi captured 17% of Bali's 2025 real estate market share, with the south-west corridor (Mengwi + North Badung + Tabanan) absorbing the majority of new transaction activity. Land prices illustrate the pricing gradient: central Canggu at $90,000 to $200,000 per are, Pererenan at $78,000 to $130,000, Seseh at $50,000 to $80,000, still the floor of the corridor but appreciating 25 to 50% since 2022.

An honest caveat on the corridor's hotel-market history and current cycle. The 2026 DRAGI study (PT Hotel Investment Advisory) ranks Canggu and Seminyak sixth of seven localities on 120-month downside-adjusted RevPAR growth but second on the 60-month window, and cautions that the recent strength is current-cycle outperformance, not yet proven long-cycle dominance; Seseh itself is not a named locality in the analysis. The same house's August 2026 Risk & Absorption Monitor adds the current read. Over the twelve months to July 2026, Canggu and Seminyak's occupied-room demand grew 3.2 percentage points slower than its supply, the locality is classed as weakening, and its near-flat RevPAR is being carried by rate rather than by occupancy. Roughly 558 rooms are scheduled to open in the locality between September 2026 and January 2028, and after phasing that pipeline the Monitor's FY2027 implied occupancy runs 62.2% in the downside case (P15), 70.6% at the median (P50), and 78.8% in the upside case (P85), against a current level of roughly 68%.

Three things follow. First, the caution applies to hotel room-night economics, which The Line does not underwrite: club demand is corridor residents and HNW residence buyers, and the only hotel-style exposure in the model is the residence-hospitality layer (base ~$1.2M of ~$5.7M Year-5 operating EBITDA, bear-cased at ~$0.8M), whose ~55% pool occupancy sits below the Monitor's all-class downside case for the locality and above the 49.4% island luxury-class occupancy recorded in 2025. Second, the corridor's premium reset should be read precisely. Regent Bali Canggu's opening at a ~$760 ADR in December 2024 is evidence of top-end pricing power in the corridor, while the Monitor's own read is that rate is currently carrying the corridor's result with physical absorption soft. The Line's revenue depends on neither. Third, locality hotel history is not a stable forecast. Ubud, the DRAGI study's long-cycle leader, is classed as weak in the Monitor (demand contracting 8.1 points faster than supply, FY2027 median occupancy below current, a further ~361 high-end branded rooms opening by May 2027), while Canggu and Seminyak ranks fourth of seven on current absorption against sixth of seven on the long-cycle measure. That instability is the reason the club underwrites recurring dues rather than room nights.

A future ADRIFT beachfront hotel remains a candidate platform expansion under the ADRIFT name. It is explicitly out of the current raise, its own site, diligence, and capital, separately underwritten if and when it proceeds.

None of the returns in this report depend on it. The investment in scope is the members club and the 18 members-only residences on the 40-are HGB site. The corridor evidence in this report (luxury ADR strength, wellness demand, the Regent and Anantara reference points) underwrites that club-and-residences case, not a hotel.

The club's recurring-revenue base is what makes it trade at an operating-business multiple rather than a hotel multiple. Three commercial properties of the membership model drive that premium, and each is amplified, not created, by the optional future hotel.

The investor owns the retained club, realized at a future liquidity event. On stabilized club EBITDA of ~$4.5M and a base exit multiple of 12×, the club alone is worth approximately $54M of enterprise value (bear ~$30M at 10× / upside ~$81M at 14×). Adding the managed-residence hospitality layer (~$1.2M Y5 EBITDA, all 18 units pooled) takes stabilized operating EBITDA to ~$5.7M and the retained operating business to roughly $68M (bear ~$38M / upside ~$103M), a deliberate discount to the Soho House precedent (~16×, Jan 2026) and a premium to the 8 to 12× that SE Asian luxury resort assets trade at. The HGB freehold land adds a replacement-cost floor underneath the EBITDA-multiple exit.

For context on the optional hotel layer: disclosed Bali ultra-luxury hotel transactions are rare and tightly held. The ultra-luxury boutique tier trades in a different universe, Cheval Blanc Randheli reportedly ~$4.3M/key, Soneva portfolio implied $3M to $5M/key, Nihi Sumba implied $3.5M to $9M/key, which would inform a separately-capitalized ADRIFT hotel were it pursued, but is not part of this raise's underwriting.

The global private members' club market was valued at $32.4B in 2024, forecast to reach $59.7B by 2033 at a 7.1% CAGR. Asia-Pacific is the fastest-growing region at 9.2% CAGR, driven by rapid urbanization, rising disposable incomes, and the expanding affluent class across China, India, Singapore, and Southeast Asia. International operators are actively expanding into Asian cities, partnering with local developers.

The market is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Traditional clubs are declining as a share of the market; modern/lifestyle clubs are experiencing the fastest growth, driven by inclusivity, contemporary design, and diverse amenities spanning dining, wellness, and cultural programming. Individual memberships represent over 55% of total market revenue, with corporate memberships the fastest-growing segment.

The convergence thesis behind the modern-club format now has independent operator-side validation in this market. Writing in August 2026, international fitness and wellness consultant Yves Preissler concludes that "the strongest wellness markets are not built by individual sectors. They are built when fitness, hospitality, healthcare, and recovery evolve together," and that consumers "no longer want wellness as one isolated service. They want the pieces to make sense together." That is a description of The Line's five-vertical, one-membership architecture from a source with no stake in the project.

A members club is the asset; the residences fund the build. The investor owns a stake in a recurring-revenue club whose first site is substantially de-risked by 18 pre-sold residences. The residences (~$4,460/m², ~$23M gross) fund construction and then run as a managed rental pool (~$1.2M Y5 EBITDA); the club plus that hospitality layer generates the ongoing return and the operating-business exit multiple. An optional ADRIFT hotel could be added later on its own site and capital. It is not part of this raise.

The land position is the first gate, not a settled fact. The club and residences sit on a 40 are (4,000 m²) HGB freehold parcel in the Seseh-Munggu corridor, a forward acquisition, identified but not yet under LOI. Acquiring it cleanly (clean title, confirmed HGB/PMA pathway, PKKPR conformity, price at/below target) is the first deployment of the equity round. HGB freehold is what removes tenure-decay risk at exit and makes the residences' HGB tenure deliverable. The separate 10 are leased parcel once associated with the project is being redirected to an unrelated brewery and is out of scope. Zoned Sub-Zone W (Tourism), 50% KDB / 2.0 KLB envelope.

The timing window is defined, not closing. A 2029 club opening follows Anantara Dragon Seseh (2027) and Mandarin Oriental (2027), which validate the corridor and push the island rate ceiling upward, by one to two years, a halo for residence absorption and any future hotel. The September 2025 construction moratorium in Badung constricts further permitted supply, raising scarcity value for a fully-entitled freehold project.

The recurring-revenue moat is quantifiable. No venue in the corridor combines HYROX-grade training, recovery, hospitality-grade F&B, professional workspace, and cultural programming under a single capped membership. Recurring dues are ~53% of club revenue at stabilization, well above Soho House's 34.7%, producing a financial profile closer to a recurring-revenue operating platform than a hotel, and that is what earns the operating-business exit multiple.

The exit case is conservative, not aspirational. On stabilized EBITDA of ~$4.5M and a base 12× multiple, the retained operating business (club + residence hospitality) is worth roughly $68M of enterprise value (bear ~$38M at 10× / upside ~$103M at 14×), a deliberate discount to the Soho House precedent (~16×). For a ~30% investor over a 7-year hold this implies ~4.3× MOIC and ~29% IRR base (bear ~2.9×/~18%; upside ~5.9×/~37%), pre-tax; net of cross-border structure ~25 to 26% base. The Founders Reserve ultra-tier carries the base case clear of a 15% hurdle, with the multi-market platform as the upside.